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Preaching politics: Islam and Christianity on the Kenya coast 
Focussing on the Kenya coast, this article analyses the developing contrast 
between the place of Islam and Christianity in public politics. It argues that 
Islam’s association with criticism of the political order contrasts with Christianity 
but that this is not the result of inherent difference between the religions. Both 
have previously provided a language, and space, for political commentary and 
activism in Kenya. The contrast is rather the contingent result of particular 
circumstances in Kenya. Christianity has become increasingly associated with 
affirming clientilism and the accumulation of wealth in a way which is avowedly 
non-political but in practice legitimates the current political order. Meanwhile, 
although individual Muslims are more likely to enjoy high political office than 
was previously the case, Muslims are also more likely to located their experience 
as symptomatic of a wider pattern of exclusion in Kenya and link this sense of 
local injustice to global inequalities. Regional and global conflicts have shaped 
that discourse and propelled a steady increase in terrorism, which has in turn 
heightened the contrast. 
Keywords: Islam; Christianity; Kenya; politics; conflict; dissent 
 
Introduction 
There is, on Youtube, a video entitled ‘MRC [Mombasa Republican Council] pastor 
holds meeting in church’. It shows the speaker – wearing a plain purple shirt and white 
dog-collar which suggest that he is a minister in a Protestant church – urging his 
audience not to register as voters for Kenya’s general elections, which were to be held 
in March 2013.
1
 The building in which he spoke appeared bare and unfinished, with 
holes for windows; the white cloth with a cross and a cloth sign bearing the message 
‘My God is Able’ were the only signs that it was a church. The speaker offered no 
theological explanations for his argument; indeed, his talk did not really touch on 
religious questions at all. He encouraged the audience, almost all of whom were young 
men, to become life members of ‘MRC’ - the Mombasa Republican Council, a group 
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that calls for the secession of Kenya’s coastal strip. Furthermore, he suggested that 
MRC meetings should be held in mosques and churches. This, he argued would allow 
members to avoid direct harassment from police or officials, and would make them less 
vulnerable to disruption by crowds of youths hired by local politicians. 
The MRC campaign, which was briefly very active in 2011-12 and still simmers 
in the background, has been seen largely as a Muslim  phenomenon, just as ‘the coast’ 
generally tends to be seen by other Kenyans as a Muslim area: a recent article 
erroneously calls the MRC ‘the latest Muslim separatist group’ in Kenya (Oded 2013). 
In fact, significant numbers of the people who live on Kenya’s coast profess 
Christianity, practising the same exuberant and occasionally rivalrous forms of 
Christian worship which are common, if not ubiquitous, across Kenya. Those who 
speak for the MRC have never  explicitly identified it as Muslim, and the speaker in the 
video above was at pains to stress that this is not a sectarian movement, announcing that 
‘I have no boundaries, I go to the pastors, I go to the imams’ (sina mipaka, naenda kwa 
mapastor, naenda kwa maimamu). But despite the interfaith, non-denominational logic 
behind the making and posting of the video it is the case that political activism at the 
coast, and the articulation of a distinctive sense of coastal disaffection, has been largely 
associated with Islam in recent decades.  
This paper discusses this phenomenon. It is our contention that the litany of 
coastal complaints – over landlessness, exclusion from political power, lack of access to 
government services and employment, poor education – has become almost 
indistinguishable from the grievances expressed by Muslim activists. It is not a 
coincidence that the loudest voice in the MRC has been that of Mohamed Mraja, a 
preacher in a Mombasa mosque. This has not always been so. The most famous coastal 
political leader of the independence period for example, the KADU politician Ronald 
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Ngala, was not a Muslim. Yet since the early 1990s the perceived ‘marginalization’ of 
the coast has tended to appear as a particular expression of the wider grievances of 
Kenyan Muslims. In local terms, it is notable that even in the midst of political activism 
in the 1990s Kenya’s churches did not become significantly involved in political 
mobilisation at the coast.  
The pastor in the Youtube video makes an explicit argument about the ability of 
the religious buildings to provide physical space for dissent: meetings in mosques and 
churches are less likely to face violent disruption than those held elsewhere. We argue 
that in Kenya, both Islam and Christianity have at certain times and in certain places 
been able to provide an institutional and social, as well as physical space, for political 
debate. Churches and mosques have protected those who comment from at least some 
of the dangers of public political speech – though this protection has not been consistent 
or complete. But more importantly both Christianity and Islam have authorised public 
commentary, and provided multiple media for the communication of that commentary – 
not just from the pulpit, but through pastoral letters, local committees, and latterly 
through DVDs, the internet and mobile phones – in ways that command attention. This 
history of religious engagement with politics makes even more pressing our core 
questions: why it is largely Islam, rather than Christianity, that has come to be 
associated with the expression of coastal dissent, and what does this reveal about the 
place of Islam and Christianity in politics at the coast – and in Kenya more widely? We 
argue that the factors that have produced this situation are local, national and 
international. The political involvement of Muslims and Christians has developed in a 
contrapuntal fashion, increasingly coming to emphasise the contrasts between the two, 
and undermining the ‘general atmosphere of tolerance and respect’ that David Sperling 
identified as a distinctive feature of religion at the coast (Sperling 2000, 158). And we 
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argue that this is the contingent result of particular local circumstance, and the very 
nature of the spaces provided by religion, rather than any innate or inevitable conflict.   
Churches, Christianities and politics in Kenya 
Kenya is formally a secular state. But its political and administrative elite have been 
largely Christian; in this, as in much else, independent Kenya closely reflected the 
political culture of the colonial state. It was from this position of established influence 
that, in the late 1980s and 1990s, Kenya’s churches – or at least, some of them – 
established a leading role in the campaign for political reforms which led to the return 
of multi-party politics (Gifford 1994, 528). Clergymen from what Gifford calls the 
‘mainline’ churches (also known as ‘historic’ churches)  – Catholic, Anglican, 
Presbyterian – were persistent critics of the ruling party and the incumbent president; 
they preached sermons whose Old Testament tales of abuse of power invited 
comparison with the present, and – less elliptically - they called directly for change 
(Sabar-Friedman 2002; Hofmeyr 2005, 372-4)). Galia Sabar-Friedman, whose work has 
emphasised the importance of the leadership provided by clergy in this period,  has 
described the role of the physical spaces provided by churches in a time of often brutal 
government repression: these were ‘the only available loci for public discussion of civil 
liberties and the limits of power’(Sabar-Friedman 1997, 31). More sceptical accounts of 
the churches’ role in this period – which have argued that the churches never espoused 
anything like a ‘liberation theology’, and that church hierarchies were considerably less 
bold than the most outspoken preachers – have nonetheless shared the sense that the 
physical and institutional presence of churches made space for political dissent in a 
manner which was profoundly important at the time. As David Throup has pointed out, 
‘only church leaders had the freedom to criticize government without risking detention’ 
(Throup 1995, 159; also Maupeu 2001).  
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Sabar-Friedman also shows that the space provided by churches was not merely 
physical; as institutions, churches provided a degree of protection to outspoken clergy, 
and they possessed a range of publications, social networks, and an ability to command 
media attention through which they could speak to a wide audience. However, as 
Gifford has emphasised in a much more critical appraisal of the relationship between 
churches and political reform in Kenya, other churches were at the same time 
supporting the incumbent government and its supporters (Gifford 2009, 216-220). 
Moreover, since the era of agitation for multiparty democracy, the number and variety 
of churches in Kenya has also seemingly grown even more swiftly than has the number 
of professed Christians (Gifford 2009, 109). The nature of these churches is particularly 
salient here. Many are vigorously physical in their forms of worship, and have a strong 
focus on individual salvation in their theology: while scholarship has struggled to 
develop a categorization for them, Gifford has suggested that a characteristic of what he 
calls ‘new’ churches has been to blur the boundaries between Pentecostal and 
Evangelical (Gifford 1994, 524-525).  
Attitudes to other religions aside, for the leaders of these churches, campaigns 
over social justice and governance were a distraction from the much more pressing task 
of preaching salvation. This difference in theological focus is furthermore emphasised 
by a contrast in material position. Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist 
churches have all been sustained by estates of land and buildings which had been built 
up under the colonial period – while Gifford calls them ‘mainline’, one might call them 
‘established’, in the very physical sense of having acquired substantial assets as gifts 
from, or carved out within, the colonial state. The multiple newer churches – there were 
quite literally thousands of them by the 1990s – lacked these inherited assets. They 
relied rather on the contributions of their followers, and on the patronage of the post-
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colonial state and politicians. That some benefitted from the support of evangelical 
missions, notably from the US, is clear. As Julie Hearn has pointed out, the late 
twentieth century seems, ironically, to have been ‘the greatest missionary era’ (2002, 
32). But to see this external support as the driving force for the success of such churches 
is to understate significantly the power of their local appeal.   
These ‘new’ churches tended not to involve themselves in challenging the 
government; indeed, some of them were explicit in their support for the regime, and for 
the incumbent president, Daniel arap Moi (Deacon and Lynch 2013, 110). As Mutahi 
Ngunyi has argued, in the case of both what he calls the ‘loyalist’ churches, such as the 
Kenya Assemblies of God, and the ‘Africanist’ churches such as Legio Maria, this was 
partly the consequence of a theology which advocated disengagement from temporal 
issues (Ngunyi 1995, 126-29). Whilst Moi finally retired from politics in 2002, the 
acquiescence by and co-option of these churches continued, along with a creeping 
similarity in role on the part of the mainline churches. In the elections of 2002 Moi’s 
chosen candidate as successor - and his party - suffered a heavy defeat. In retrospect, 
this looks more like managed transition than a dramatic victory for a political 
opposition, since the new government included many politicians who had occupied 
senior positions at various points during Moi’s long incumbency (Anderson 2003). The 
reformist activism of the churches had already weakened since 1997, as a result of 
government manipulation and internal rivalries (Maupeu 2001). Under the new 
president, Mwai Kibaki, even the mainline churches seemed increasingly at ease with 
the government, and more concerned to involve themselves in development projects 
than in politics. In the election of 2007 many clergy – including some quite senior 
figures - were drawn into partisan politics in very apparent ways (Gifford 2009, 43-45; 
221-23). The alleged role of some churches in ethnic partisanship and even incitement 
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to violence is indicative of a general move away from civil society activism or 
movements for social justice outside of the established political order.   
The churches’ change of attitude to political reform was most vividly displayed 
in the debates over the new constitution – which had been a key demand of the churches 
in the early 1990s (Mapeu 2001, 58-59; Sabar-Friedman 1997, 52). When a draft 
constitution was put to popular referendum in 2005, the churches opposed it on the 
grounds that it was too liberal; they argued that it should absolutely preclude abortion 
and gay marriage. The churches were also opposed to its offer of formal recognition to 
what are called Kadhi courts, which have long existed in Kenya as courts dealing with 
matters of domestic law between Muslims, but were not mentioned in the previous 
constitution (Gifford, 2009: 41). Some clergymen argued publicly that this was part of a 
wider Muslim conspiracy to take over not only Kenya, but Africa as a whole 
(Mwakimako 2007). On this, almost all churches were agreed - from the major 
‘established’ churches to the new ecstatic churches that had sprung up since the 1990s 
in urban areas to the multiple, fragmented rural churches born of local rivalries and 
family schism all across the country. In the referendum the draft was defeated, but this 
seems to have been the result of popular feeling that it did not offer enough devolution, 
rather than the consequence of the churches’ attitude (Kimenyi 2006). Tellingly, when 
another draft was put to referendum in 2010, proposing substantially more devolution of 
power, the churches opposed it again – but this time it was approved with a significant 
majority.  
Given the previous enthusiasm of the mainline churches for reform, their 
opposition to the two drafts was a surprising decision. It appears to have been 
significantly influenced by Kenya’s evolving religious and political circumstances. In 
particular, established churches in Kenya – like those elsewhere in Africa – had been 
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concerned that their adherents were turning to the mushrooming new churches 
(Asamoah-Gyadu 2002, 23-27). Christians in Kenya had become very willing to involve 
themselves with multiple different churches at the same time, and the presence – and the 
collection-money – of worshippers in the mainline churches could no longer be 
assumed (Gifford 1994, 521; 524). The attraction of what has been called ‘neo-
Pentecostalism’ for ordinary people has multiple explanations: Kwabena Asamoah-
Gyadu, writing of Africa more widely, has seen this as driven both by aspiration and by 
hardship, by an ‘ardent desire to respond to problems and frustrations for which 
Africans seek answers’(Asamoah-Gyadu 2002, 35). Deacon and Lynch, writing 
specifically of Kenya, have similarly located the rise of neo-Pentecostalism in a sense of 
crisis and uncertainty: they suggest that ‘neo-Pentecostalist narratives help ordinary 
people assert some control over their own lives’ (Deacon and Lynch 2013, 125). 
Asamoah-Gyadu has also observed, more critically, the power of the ‘desire to be 
successful’, and an assumption that material prosperity will be the reward for faith 
(Asamoah-Gyadu, 2002, 28). In consequence, devotional practice - including that seen 
in established churches – increasingly takes a neo-Pentecostal form. While Catholic or 
Anglican clergy with a thorough training in scripture might still look down on the 
preachers of many other churches as lacking in scriptural training, they were 
uncomfortably aware that congregations did not share their scepticism (Deacon and 
Lynch 2013, 115). Thus, while Kenya’s multiple Christianities have continued to be 
marked by a multiplicity of churches there has been a degree of convergence in practice 
driven by the expectations of churchgoers. This is the religious context in which local 
and national issues are predominantly played out.  
Kenya’s politicians have shown themselves as flexible in their religious 
allegiances as are the populace, attending multiple churches. Bluntly put, while there is 
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no official religion in Kenya, this convergence has produced a set of devotional 
practices and attitudes towards politics which permeate public culture and have come to 
be involved in authorizing power.  This ‘domesticated’ form (Gifford 2009, 241) has 
combined the ‘conservative evangelical’ tradition of the mainline churches with what 
Gifford drily calls the ‘very materialist understanding of favour or blessing’ associated 
with the newer churches. This is characterised by conservatism over key social issues, 
and by a concern with individual salvation, and prosperity. It has also tended to be 
hostile to Islam, in line with the wider pattern of new churches (Gifford 1994, 530). 
This approach – and is – also inclined to conservatism in political terms; overtly 
depoliticized, but in practice closely involved in and reproducing, the political order 
(Deacon and Lynch 2013, 112). National and local politicians attend church services – 
and act as patrons at church fund-raisers – in a very public way; they are photographed 
for the media at these events, and often make statements after them.
2
 These activities 
are very often political, in a narrow sense, used by politicians to score points off one 
another and criticize rivals – but they are not calls for systemic change or dramatic 
political reform.
3
  Kalonzo Musyoka, for example - former vice-president and now 
senior opposition politician – attended services and fund-raisings, and made political 
statements,  at many different churches in the three years 2011-14: among them 
Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Africa Inland Church, as well as 
very ‘new’ churches like the Jesus Celebration  Centre.4 Appearing at these Christian 
events is clearly important to politicians, but not because they offer protection for the 
articulation of radical criticism: instead, they affirm involvement in a shared political 
culture which revolves around patronage and the overt display of the material trappings 
of success. 
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The mainline National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) still issues 
occasional political statements, although these have tended to take a form so generalized 
as to be unobjectionable from almost any standpoint (Gifford 2009, 61). In the 2013 
general election clergy still involved themselves in governance programmes and 
espoused the need for good governance. However, the churches also largely confined 
their activities to support for an overriding emphasis on ‘peace’ which came to 
dominate civil society electoral work (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2014). When the 
NCCK did issue a statement which seemed to question the presidential ambitions of 
Uhuru Kenyatta – on the grounds that he was at the time facing international charges 
(later dropped) for complicity in the 2008 post-election violence – there was a brief 
furore, followed by a confused and messy retraction.
5
 Otherwise, the mainline churches 
steered away from explicit political statements other than the generalized call for peace 
– though candidates for local and national office attended church in more or less 
ostentatious ways, and offered comments to the press after services.
6
 
Some of the newer churches took a more active role in the 2013 elections, and in 
certain cases their involvement took a distinctive form.  As with the mainline churches, 
candidates addressed congregations at services.
7
  ‘Prayer rallies’ were also organized 
for candidates; nominally interfaith, these were in tone and style very much ‘new’ 
church events, at which prayers were said for candidates and/or they received blessings; 
the winning candidates, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, also received public 
blessings after their victory.
8
 The Catholic hierarchy in Kenya declared that ‘we will not 
allow our churches and prayer meetings to be turned into political platforms’, but this 
did not deter other clergy.
9
 In some instances this was very evidently done in return for 
money; but more generally it evoked a set of ideas about the importance of individual 
salvation and success:  those who repent and accept Christ will be blessed, and will 
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prosper – whether this was in terms of material wealth or political office. Again, this 
was a message which was both overtly depoliticized and profoundly political: success is 
the reward for accepting Christ, and those who possess power or wealth do so because 
they are blessed.  
Christians and Politics at the Coast 
A significant proportion of the population of the coast profess Christianity; indeed, 
some Christian leaders have claimed privately that Christians are a majority there.
10
 Yet 
the defining characteristic of the churches there is an apparent sense of vulnerability. 
This is perhaps surprising: Christian evangelism began on the coast earlier than in other 
parts of Kenya, and by the 1890s there were a number of mission stations in and around 
Mombasa. But this early mission experience itself established the sense of vulnerability. 
In the early years, the missions existed with the uneasy approval of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar and came repeatedly into conflict with a local Muslim elite, partly of Arab 
origin, who objected to their evangelism and to their willingness to harbour runaway 
slaves (Strayer 1978). The missions’ initial aim had been the conversion of non-Muslim 
peoples of the coast, notably those now known as the Mijikenda, but their lack of 
success there led them to build Christian communities by taking in slaves, some freed 
by British anti-slave trade patrols and some runaways. This was a venture in which they 
received the (occasionally grudging) support of the British officials who administered 
the coast from the late 1880s, and whose assistance allowed the missions to build up 
significant communities on land granted to them. This pattern of sometimes reluctant 
official support endured throughout the colonial period, during which the number of 
Mijikenda Christians grew a little, and a modest population of migrant African 
Christians from up-country developed at the coast. 
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Since independence – and especially since the 1970s – the number of Christians 
on the coast has increased greatly, as it has elsewhere in Kenya. Partly this is because 
more Mijikenda now profess Christianity; but there has also been a substantial 
movement to the coast of Christians from elsewhere in Kenya, many of whom are now 
second or third generation coast dwellers – though some still refer to them as ‘up-
country’ people (Sperling 1978, 158-159). This migrant population is largest in and 
around Mombasa, with other concentrations around Malindi and Mpeketoni.  This 
Christian growth has had one other distinctive feature: broadly, it is people from 
elsewhere in Kenya who have been most prominent in the leadership of ‘new’ churches 
at the coast. This particular history has shaped Christian political involvement.  
In the debates over secession and regionalism around the time of independence 
in the early 1960s, Christianity played a limited, though not insignificant role. As 
explained below, secessionism was very much associated with Muslims, but the 
opposition to it was expressed in racial, not religious terms. The alternative, regionalist 
movement - which sought substantial devolution of power and had a brief moment of 
success in the independence majimbo constitution – was strong on Kenya’s coast, where 
it was led largely by men with Christian names, who had been baptized and educated by 
missions. But it was their education rather than their faith which made them leaders. 
These mission-schooled men were a minority in their own communities, and their 
successful mobilisation of a following played first to the emerging idea of a collective 
Mijikenda identity and then to a wider idea of ‘coastal’ identity (Willis and Gona 
2013a). Aware that they were a religious minority, they did not use Christian language 
or religious issues to make their arguments or mobilise followers; their arguments 
turned rather on autochthony, and the danger that people from ‘up-country’ would use 
 
14 
their political power in an independent Kenya to appropriate coastal land and 
monopolize government employment (Willis and Gona 2013b). 
The idea of a distinctly ‘coastal’ politics, with its own agenda, did not reemerge 
until the 1990s, when the complex consequences of the return of multi-partyism sparked 
a resurgence of the debates over devolution which had been quashed when Kenya’s first 
president, Kenyatta, engineered the dismantling of the majimbo constitution in 1964-65. 
It is evident that people within President Moi’s ruling KANU party encouraged a 
revival of the debate over devolution in search of immediate political advantage 
(Mazrui 1997). But this was an idea which found a ready reception at the coast. In terms 
of educational attainment and wealth, the coast had fallen well behind some other parts 
of Kenya; and landlessness had become an ever-more pressing problem.  There was a 
sense among some of those who considered themselves ‘indigenous’ coast people that 
the worst fears of the early 1960s had been realized, and many argued that ‘up-country’ 
people – particularly Kikuyu – had exploited political power to enrich themselves at the 
expense of ‘coast’ people. The belief that much land at the coast had fallen into the 
hands of ‘up-country’ people – whether through well-connected individuals acquiring 
large plots, or through landless families from the highlands being given preference in 
settlement schemes – was an increasingly powerful force in coastal politics(Kanyinga 
1998).  
For Christian churches, this sense of coastal grievance was problematic. In so far 
as the mainline churches had been advocates of political reform in Kenya, this had been 
within an explicitly national frame. These were, after all, national churches in terms of 
their structures, and the consultations between the major churches took place in a 
national forum, the National Council of Churches of Kenya. That some churches were 
stronger in particular regions was apparent, but all these churches were avowedly 
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Kenyan in their political perspective; the politics of local particularism might be lively 
within these churches, but they were never open. The leadership of these churches was  
in the hands of ‘up country’ people, who lacked the credibility to reframe coastal 
grievances as national ones; and the established churches were themselves the 
beneficiaries of colonial land policies and so were poorly-placed to argue the case of 
landless squatters.  The leadership of ‘new’ churches on the coast tended to be drawn 
from people who were considered ‘up-country’, and their approach was dominated by a 
theology of personal transformation. This combination left no space for Christian 
activism over the notion of collective coastal marginalisation.  Symptomatically, during 
the 2010 debate over the new constitution – which was broadly popular at the coast 
because of its provisions for devolution – it was a body representing new churches at 
the coast which took legal action to try and delay the referendum:  the Mombasa 
Pastors’ Association argued (unsuccessfully) that the public had not been given time to 
consider the implications of the provisions on Kadhi courts, marriage and the ‘right to 
life’.11   
What is most notable for our present purpose is that no significant Kenyan 
Christian voice emerged to champion the coast or argue for devolution (although the 
redoubtable Father Gabriel Dolan has consistently campaigned over land issues).  
Instead, over a period of more than decade in which a series of violent incidents 
provided sporadic reminders of the intensity of disaffection, Islam provided the physical 
and institutional spaces for talking about this; and there has been a conflation of the 
grievances of coastal people and the grievances of Muslims. This has occurred despite 
the profound divisions amongst Muslims at the coast, which have been repeatedly noted 
by the literature (Ndzovu 2012). This process has been encouraged by an international 
narrative of Muslim marginalization, but it also reflects the very particular Kenyan 
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context of Christian domination nationally. This is why we have deliberately chosen to 
set out the national, Christian context before considering the role of Islam itself – in 
order to emphasise that we see the contrast between Islam and Christianity as the 
product of particular political circumstance, rather than as the inevitable consequence of 
religious difference.  
Islam and the politics of the coast 
The state had come to the coast as a Muslim phenomenon: in the independent little city-
sultanates of the pre-Portuguese period, and again under Omani/Zanzibari rule from the 
early eighteenth century. Under British rule, the Islamic identity of the state had been 
both subordinated and maintained – since the coast was, nominally, the territory of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar and only under British ‘protection’, Muslim administrators and a 
Muslim judicial system remained in place, though the former were increasingly 
circumscribed in their role and almost vestigial by the 1960s (Salim 1973). The politics 
of secessionism in the early 1960s explicitly turned partly on issues of religion. 
Advocates of secession feared that Islamic education and Kadhi courts would be 
abolished by an independent Kenya (Brennan 2008). But this religious issue was 
trumped by race and ethnicity: while the economic and political elite of the coast were 
Muslim Arabs or Swahili, they were a minority of the population. There were many 
other Muslims on the coast – but in the political debates of the time they 
overwhelmingly identified themselves as Africans and/or as Mijikenda, and rejected the 
idea of secession, which they suspected to be a device to preserve Arab dominance 
(Willis and Gona 2013b).  
In the following decades, Islam played a role in factional coastal politics – along 
with race and ethnicity – but it did not become major mobilizing force. While the 
passage of the Succession Act in the early 1980s was widely resented by Muslims, the 
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campaign against this was decidedly low-key (Ndovu 2009). Most governments 
included one or two Muslim ministers, appointed on a more or less explicitly token 
basis; two mildly rivalrous national representative organisations for Muslims emerged 
in succession, each of them studiously loyal to the government (Bakari 1995; 
Mwakimako 1995). What one Muslim called ‘the struggle of Islam in a Christian-
dominated country’ was waged in a very quiet way in these years (Mwakimako 1995, 
294). The two regions of Kenya with significant Muslim populations – the coast, and 
the north-east – remained marginal in different ways. The prolonged Shifta war in the 
north-east, waged by Somali irredentists who wished to unite their territory with the 
then Somali Republic, left the north-east very much on the boundaries of Kenya – 
minimally administered, subject to extreme coercion, and poorly integrated with the rest 
of the country economically or culturally (Mburu 2005; Whittaker 2008). The coast, on 
the other hand, was very much a part of the Kenyan economy and – as noted above – 
many Kenyans from other parts of the country moved to live and work there. Coastal 
people may sometimes have resented other Kenyans, but there was not the cultural and 
experiential gulf that marked the north-east. 
Throughout this period, however, significant changes were occurring in coastal 
Islam. Movements of Islamic reform, financed by a variety of bodies, challenged a 
range of religious practices which were denounced as innovations; these issues also 
provided a way to challenge entrenched social hierarchies. From the 1980s, a sometimes 
countervailing programme of education was pursued by Shi’ite organizations (Kresse 
2009, 2007). These debates over practice and ‘proper living’ were sometimes combined 
with a wider political sense of a need to create the right conditions for the Muslim 
community: which might be seen as requiring reform of an international system 
dominated by the west, or as involving more local political action. This new sense of a 
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need for reform provided a point of consensus for a Muslim population – on the coast, 
and in Kenya more widely – which has been characterized by multiple, chronic 
divisions which run along ethnic and regional lines. Those divisions have encouraged 
the multiplication of rival leadership organizations, and persistent political disunity 
amongst Muslims (Constantin 1993; Ndzovu 2012; Mwakimako and Willis 2016); yet 
despite that disunity, Islam became a way to express criticism of the existing political 
and economic order.   What Joseph Wandera calls the resulting ‘renewed assertiveness’ 
of the Muslim community could very easily be combined with the grievances of a 
coastal community more widely – over educational provision, employment and  land 
(Wandera 2008-2009). And so, in the early 1990s, Islam became associated with the 
articulation of this coastal dissent: Muslim institutions made a ‘belated appearance in 
popular struggles’ (Ngunyi 1995, 143)  in the context of what Sara Thordsen (2009) has 
called a ‘new Muslim activism’. 
The immediate manifestation of this was the formation of the Islamic Party of 
Kenya (IPK) in 1992. Created in Mombasa in the first months after Kenya’s 
constitution was changed to allow multi-partyism, the party was never permitted to 
register formally. But it retained a sort of existence – as an organization, and as a 
rallying-point for disaffection – for several years thereafter, despite a prolonged wrangle 
over leadership between its original founders and a vocal preacher called Khalid Balala, 
who sought to hitch his own political ambitions to IPK (Oded 1996). IPK claimed to 
represent all Muslims in Kenya, but it was very much dominated by coastal Muslims, 
and the wave of demonstrations, riots and graffiti-spraying associated with it were 
almost entirely confined to the coast, and especially the southern coast, with Mombasa 
as the epicentre.  
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Much of the language of the IPK was explicitly Islamic, and the formal reason 
for the refusal of registration was that Kenyan law does not permit sectarian parties. 
Balala’s street-preaching, in particular, placed much emphasis on issues of morality and 
behaviour within the Muslim community. But this was combined with a wider critique 
of government policy, and demands for reform; and for a time the IPK cooperated with 
secular national parties in the campaign for political change (Bakari 2013; Oded 1996 
Wandera 2008-2009).
12
 IPK’s leaders struggled to counter the accusation that they 
pursued an exclusively Islamic agenda: in a conversation with a journalist, Balala 
insisted that he was a Kenyan nationalist, and that imposition of sharia law was not his 
aim: ‘Ours is to show the people that we have a path, a solution to their grievances and 
to their economic, political and all other problems’.13 This was, at least formally, a party 
which demanded political inclusion and full participation as the remedy for a range of 
social and economic grievances. It was very largely a coastal, regional, phenomenon, 
but it was not a separatist movement (whatever the ambitions of some of its youthful 
followers). In 1993 the IPK called for protest against ethnic violence elsewhere in 
Kenya, declaring that ‘If democracy is the rule of the people by the people and for the 
people, is it not time that the people decided to take their fate in their hands?’14 
Wandera’s argument that ‘Muslim public identity has emerged in Kenya based on a 
common experience of marginality’ is both perceptive and suggestive – for, as it 
implies, Muslim politics could lend itself to the expression of multiple kinds of 
marginality (Wandera 2008-2009, 21). 
The government response to IPK agitation combined direct repression and the 
‘vulgarization’ of violence to proxy gangs with some limited concessions to Muslims. 
Khalid Balala was detained repeatedly, on a series of charges – treason, incitement - and 
was for a time deprived of citizenship (Oded 1996). IPK meetings were broken up by 
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police; a counter-organization called the United Muslims of Africa (UMA) was created, 
with money channelled from government through the coastal politician Emmanuel 
Karisa Maitha – not himself a Muslim, as he admitted (Ngunyi, 1995; Ndzovu 2009, 6-
7).
15
 UMA launched an explicitly racial campaign against IPK which exploited the 
perennial weak-point of coastal solidarity, the divide between Africans and ‘Arabs’: 
Maitha alleged that ‘Arabs were funding the IPK to enslave black Muslims’.16 The two 
groups’ followers engaged in vicious street battles for a period in 1993-94; and by 1996, 
the heat had gone out of the IPK campaign.  
This did not end Muslim political activism, however; nor did it discourage the 
identification of Muslim grievances with other forms of perceived marginalisation. 
These have been consistent features of coastal politics in particular, and Kenya politics 
more widely since the 1990s, as Islam’s place in Kenyan politics was further affected by 
the complex consequences of the conflict in Somalia and the spill over from an  
international campaign of terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’ launched in response to 
this(Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). Muslims in Kenya found themselves newly 
vulnerable to the often arbitrary violence of the state, and were increasingly involved in 
confrontations with police and government (Open Society Justice Initiative/Muslims for 
Human Rights 2013). At the same time they were increasingly exposed to denunciations 
of both the Kenyan state and the international order which were delivered by preachers, 
expressed in terms of Islam, and delivered in a rapidly-proliferating range of media, 
from lectures in mosques to CDs to the internet.
17
 While leading Kenyan politicians 
might rail against interference by Western governments who sought to promote multi-
partyism, Muslim activists  have denounced the Kenya government as a servant of 
Western interests, and insisted that ‘the West’ is fundamentally hostile to Islam; though 
it should be emphasised, not all these radical critics call explicitly for violence.
18
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Occasional acts of terrorism became more common; but, partly in separation from this, 
Islam became something like a default language of oppositionism. It could take violent 
and revolutionary form, in the language of some preachers or the internet postings of 
virtual jihadists; or it could be simply defiant, persistently questioning the legitimacy of 
established power. 
The experience of involvement in IPK changed the nature of formal Muslim 
political activism, on the coast and elsewhere in Kenya. The attempt to form a separate 
party was not repeated until 2012 (when it attracted little interest) and organizations 
tended to avoid the assertive – indeed, egocentric – confrontations of which Balala had 
been so fond. Instead activism was channelled into civil society work. In 1997, after the 
effective demise of IPK, an organization called – not coincidentally – CIPK (the 
Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya) emerged, again based in Mombasa initially, 
though it developed a much wider coastal and then national presence. CIPK was, as its 
name suggests, an organization of Muslim preachers, rather than a political party, but its 
aims echoed the idea that the campaign against the ‘marginalization’ of Muslims  could 
be pursued alongside that for reform more widely: as its leaders retrospectively 
explained, CIPK ‘started as an idea of various Muslim leaders who realized that there 
was urgent need to come together and find avenues to provide a voice of relief and 
reason for marginalized communities and a unified voice for Muslims in particular’.19  
The overall effect of this has been that while Christian churches  have become 
increasingly reluctant to criticise the holders of power, Muslim voices, on the other 
hand – especially at the coast - have been ever more willing to challenge government, 
whether through radical sermons or through workshops and press releases. The pattern 
has been self-reinforcing: as oppositionism has come to be associated with Islam, 
Christian leaders have become increasingly reluctant to criticize government. In 2010, 
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the arrest and expulsion of a visiting radical preacher, Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal, 
sparked off violent protests in Mombasa and Nairobi.  CIPK leaders worked the story 
into their narrative of oppression – calling it ‘an assault on Muslims’.20 ‘We are tired of 
systematic harassment by this Government’, one was quoted as saying; while another 
reportedly declared that ‘it has come to a point where we as Muslims have to start the 
second liberation.
21
 One of these leaders also explicitly compared the preacher’s 
detention to the situation in Guantanamo.
22
  
This radicalism was not, however, completely uniform, nor did it inspire Muslim 
unity. Persistent rivalries over positions of leadership – driven by personal ambitions 
and by ethnic, regional and racial divides, as well as by class – encouraged the 
emergence of multiple organizations claiming to work for the interests of Muslims, 
nationally and on the coast. Some of these have been studiously loyal to the government 
of the day, seeing this as a more effective route to influence than strident public 
activism. Even as the CIPK were rushing to denounce the government over the al-Faisal 
case, some organizations were much more cautious. In recent years, there have been 
more Muslims in government, as senior civil servants and as politicians (Bakari 2013). 
This is partly a deliberate attempt to reverse the previous severe underrepresentation of 
Muslims; to some extent it also reflects Kenya’s particular politics of regional alliance, 
in which rival national leaders seek the support of particular local allies.  Somalis, in 
particular, have achieved a new political prominence; this has, if anything, increased 
rivalries, and the persistently expressed hope that Muslims might actually act as a 
collective bloc has been confounded by these divides.  
The role of religious opposition has also carried its own perils. CIPK and similar 
organizations have been able to develop reach and influence partly by successful 
cooperation with international donors anxious to provide funds which might 
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simultaneously promote human rights and good governance and discourage 
‘radicalization’ (Lind and Howell 2008).  That support has compounded a fundamental 
problem for Muslim activists, who have trodden a difficult path. Criticism of 
government is popular, and can effectively be wound together both with a narrative 
about the international subordination of Muslims, and with the position about plight of 
the marginalized in Kenya, generally. These languages of victimhood have great 
emotive power, and they locate Islam as the natural recourse and support of the 
oppressed.  But public expressions of radicalism risk arrest, or worse.  Muslim NGOs 
accused of links to terrorism have been closed down (Mwakimako 2007, 293).  In the 
last few years a number of known or alleged radical Muslims have been shot dead by 
police, have disappeared, or have been killed by unknown attackers (Open Society 
Justice Initiative/Muslims for Human Rights 2013, 28-35).
23
 Islam still has an ability to 
authorise political comment – the media are generally quick to give publicity to those 
who claim to speak as ‘Muslim leaders’ – but it does not necessarily offer protection. 
Yet those who are too temperate in their critique, and who explicitly distance 
themselves from violence, are likely to be outflanked by more radical speakers.  
While Muslim formal institutions have been cautious, the internet has offered 
ample space for radical expression. More strikingly, it has become apparent that 
mosques as physical spaces are relatively easy to access, because of the extreme 
decentralization which is the characteristic of their organization. Historically, mosques 
have often been associated with particular individuals or families; but the proliferation 
of mosques in recent years – often sponsored by overseas donors – has left many in the 
hands either of salaried imams or of very ad hoc committees which are often weak. 
Some committees have very limited power over who is permitted to speak in the 
mosque, or what they say. A determined preacher or preachers with a relatively small 
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but organized group of supporters can effectively insist on their right to speak, and use 
the space to denounce government, the West, and the moderation of Muslim civil 
society - the involvement of the latter with western donors offers a ready focus for those 
who accuse them of having betrayed the cause of Islam, and of the oppressed.
24
 In 
2013-14, struggles for control of mosques in Mombasa – in which imams accused of 
cooperation with the state were physically attacked and driven out by organized groups 
with a more radical agenda – demonstrated how mosques may be taken over as 
platforms (Mwakimako and Willis 2014).
25
 While Muslim civil society organisations 
willingly pursue ‘interfaith’ programmes with Christians, these more radical preachers 
are more likely to explicitly see the churches as allies of the Kenyan state, and as a 
threat to Islam. The prominence in coastal Christianity of people from elsewhere in the 
country allows churches to be seen as symbols of the oppression both of Islam and of 
the coast; explicit hostility to Christianity has grown, contrapuntal to the evangelical 
Christian denunciations of Islam. Islam has come to provide the principal public space 
for opposition; but this has made leadership, and its messages, even more fractured and 
contested.  
These are some of the issues, historically rooted and constantly changing with 
unfolding events, which are vital in understanding coastal and national politics in 
Kenya. They represent far more than, for example, simplistic descriptions of the 
importation of jihadi ideologies allow. The coast witnessed vigorous arguments before 
and after the elections of 2013, largely cast as a Muslim debate, over participation, 
democracy and the relationship of the coast to the rest of Kenya. Christian debates and 
activism were much more muted – and were strikingly conservative and defensive in 
nature, focussing on the preservation of peace and order, and the need for the 
government to protect churches. Ironically, both Christians and Muslims portrayed 
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themselves as vulnerable, but they conceived the remedy for that in very different ways: 
Christians demanded that the Kenyan state should protect them from radical Muslims; 
Muslims sought to protect themselves from the state.  
The 2013 elections and after 
In some ways, churches on the coast behaved just as other churches in Kenya did. The 
mainline churches involved themselves explicitly in campaigns for peaceful 
participation in the election, and offered guidance which was generalized to the point of 
cliché, though in some cases it did hint at popular discontent: the Anglican bishop of 
Mombasa urged voters to choose ‘competent’ politicians but also ‘elect leaders who 
will deliver them from their misery’.26 Candidates for office attended church services or 
inveigled their way into funerals, and sometimes were allowed to address worshippers 
or mourners. Clergymen in mainline churches were expected to avoid partisan 
statements from the pulpit, and mostly seem to have done so, but the political views of 
some were an open secret. Some church workers were recruited as campaign agents by 
one (or sometimes more than one) candidate; arguably, their role in these cases was not 
very much different to that of the multitude of other low level intermediaries who 
turned their modest local social capital to election purposes in return for reward.  
Some ‘new’ churches played more openly partisan roles. The Mombasa 
Pentecostal Church openly endorsed one of the candidates for the Mombasa 
governorship – principally, it seems, because he was the only Christian candidate. The 
bishop of the Kisima cha Neema ya Mwana Daudi (‘Well of the Blessing of David’s 
Child’) church, Mary Kagendo, publicly blessed the presidential candidate for the 
Jubilee Coalition, Uhuru Kenyatta – continuing an association with Uhuru’s running-
mate, William Ruto, which stretched back to the 2010 referendum, when they had 
together denounced the constitution for going against ‘Biblical teaching’.27 Bishop 
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Wilfred Lai prayed for Uhuru and Ruto at his Jesus Celebration Centre in suburban 
Mombasa, and ‘declared their innocence’ of charges brought against them in connection 
with the 2007-8 post-election violence.
28
  After his election victory, Uhuru returned to 
Mary Kagendo’s church: addressing the worshippers as ‘my fellow Christians’, he went 
on to ‘thank God for all he has done for us’.29 
At the coast, however, the churches were principally concerned to demand that 
the state protect them, and to situate themselves as good citizens whose concern was to 
promote peaceful political participation rather than to demand change. Their language 
was increasingly hostile to Islam – though not always entirely publicly. A post on the 
Facebook page of a (Muslim) candidate for the governorship of Mombasa alleged ‘that 
there r some pastors who have started asking xstians not 2 vote 4 amuslim leader here in 
msa county fearing that this county will b governd using sharia law [sic]’.30  When 
Aboud Rogo, a radical Muslim preacher, was murdered by unknown attackers in 
August 2012, rioters burned down the Salvation Army church on Mombasa Island. The 
Mombasa Church Forum – a new organization, which brought together mainline and 
new churches  - held a meeting at which it demanded an apology from the ‘Muslim 
leadership’ for the burning of the church, and called for (unspecified) government 
action, declaring that ‘enough is enough’.31 In line with the practice of churches cross 
Kenya, the Mombasa Church Forum organized an ‘interdenominational prayer and 
peace rally’ in the run up the elections, and it also organized a debate for gubernatorial 
candidates, which provided the opportunity for public demands that all candidates 
promise to protect Christians.
32
 With the exception of the pastor mentioned at the 
beginning of this article, it seems churches at the coast preached a largely consistent 
message: urging peaceful participation and acceptance of the results of the elections; 
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while at the same time positioning themselves as loyal citizens, threatened by radical 
Islam. 
Mosques saw much more debate – which was also pursued on the internet and 
through news conferences. A vocal, if apparently small, body of opinion demanded a 
boycott of the elections, denouncing the very idea of elections as kufr, ‘unbelief’; 
graffiti in Mombasa declared kura ni haramu, ‘voting is forbidden’.33 One website 
explicitly located its denunciation of the election in the context of global injustice:  
These politics are a colonial tool used by the West ... Western countries compete in 
getting their political puppets from these countries and sponsor them so as to win 
elections and later on form their governments that help achieve their colonial 
objectives.
34
 
At this point, the campaign of the MRC and the propaganda of international Islamism 
intersected, each seeking to assert the illegitimacy of the Kenyan state. An opposed 
argument for Muslim participation was much more widely made, though this still turned 
on an idea of oppositionism: Muslims had to vote, it was argued, to protect themselves 
from mistreatment by the state.
35
 In the event, there was no evidence of a general 
boycott  - more people voted at the coast than in any previous election; we do not know 
what proportion of these voters were Muslim though (Willis and Chome 2014; 
Mwakimako and Willis 2016). 
In the aftermath of the elections, these two very different patterns of religious 
involvement in politics have persisted. A very public politics of overtly Muslim 
discontent has been apparent: radical Muslim speakers have continued to attract crowds, 
mostly of disaffected young men, to certain mosques at the coast, and have preached 
messages which intertwine local grievances with what they see as the wider 
international oppression of Islam by its enemies. Their critique has fed into growing 
violence at the coast, involving attacks by radical Islamists and an apparent campaign of 
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targeted assassination by security forces, which has become increasingly entangled with 
al-Shabaab  (Anderson and McKnight, 2015; Mwakimako and Willis, 2014).    
Government attempts to suppress such preaching, such as the breaking up of a 
‘jihad convention’ in Mombasa in February 2014, have often been clumsy. 36 But they 
have apparently had the tacit support of some mosque committees and other 
organizations who find their position undermined by the preachers, and so have been 
seized upon by some Muslim critics as further evidence of the government’s bias, and 
of the complicity of ‘moderate’ leaders – leading to new divisions within CIPK, for 
example.
37
  Other prominent Muslims have struggled to strike a balance between 
distancing themselves from radicalism while condemning state violence – and have 
attracted fierce criticism for doing so.
38
 Meanwhile, Christian churches have continued 
to present themselves as the vulnerable victims of radical Islam.
39
  In 2014 a murderous 
attack on the congregation of a ‘new’ church in the southern Mombasa suburb of Likoni 
(and bomb attacks in Nairobi not long after) was closely followed by the arrest of 
hundreds of Muslim ‘suspects’ in large-scale round-ups in Mombasa and Nairobi.40  
In the wake of the Mombasa church attacks, a senior administrator called 
publicly for police to shoot to kill when dealing with possible terrorist suspects.
41
  
Muslim organizations have criticized such threats, and mass detentions.
 42
  In turn, they 
have then been denounced for sympathizing with terrorism when they challenge arrests, 
and have faced increasing harassment from the state.
43
 Such bluster suggests how the 
security forces have struggled both to cope with the challenge of radical violence, and to 
distinguish between critical Muslim activism and terrorism.  Violent radicals play on 
and encourage that failure, using terror to polarise. After an armed gang massacred 
nearly 100 civilians in a series of brutal attacks around Mpeketoni in July 2014, they 
disseminated a video which showed them ostentatiously sparing Muslims, and 
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justifying the murder of non-Muslims by reference to the raids on mosques in 
Mombasa, and with the claim that Mpeketoni is Muslim land, seized by Christians.
44
 
The apparent division between Christian and Muslim attitudes to the state has become 
increasingly stark. 
Conclusion 
Writing in the UK’s Observer newspaper on the 26th of January 2014, former British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair argued – echoing Samuel Huntington – that ‘[t]he battles of 
this century are less likely to be the product of extreme political ideology – like those of 
the 20th century – but they could easily be fought around the questions of cultural or 
religious difference.’  In this article, we have suggested that on Kenya’s coast, the 
distinction between an obedient, conservative, nationalist Christianity, and a Muslim 
community which is routinely associated with opposition to the government, has never 
been more apparent. But, unlike Blair, we do not see this distinction as fundamentally 
the product of religious difference. Our argument is that this contrast grows from 
political circumstances, which have offered Muslims and Christians very different ways 
of engaging with the state.   
Mainline Christian churches in Kenya – fearful of losing followers to ‘new’ 
churches, have become increasingly reluctant to criticize the holders of power. They are 
closely connected with the politically powerful, and espouse theology that is both 
explicitly apolitical and immensely political in its reflection and reproduction of the 
inequitable status quo; and on the coast, church leaders express their loyalty to the 
government by emphasising their vulnerability. Islam, on the other hand, has 
increasingly come to be associated with a critique of the established order, a position 
which arises both from particular local circumstance and from a wider, international 
language of radicalism. This does not mean that all Christians on the coast are 
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enthusiasts for the established order, nor that all Muslims are critics; neither religion 
constitutes a homogenous political community, and Muslim politics remain fractured, 
ambiguous, and riven by the discordant factors that challenge collective action 
throughout Kenya. Yet a pattern of political involvement has clearly been set: the public 
spaces created by Islam are associated with political opposition, while those associated 
with Christianity are not. 
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